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Abstract. We consider the Cauchy problem for an elliptic operator, formulated as a Nash
game. The over specified Cauchy data are split among two players : the first player solves
the elliptic equation with the Dirichlet part of the Cauchy data prescribed over the accessible
boundary, and a variable Neumann condition (which we call first player’s strategy) prescribed
over the inaccessible part of the boundary. The second player makes use correspondingly of
the Neumann part of the Cauchy data, with a variable Dirichlet condition prescribed over the
inaccessible part of the boundary. The first player then minimizes the gap related to the non
used Neumann part of the Cauchy data, and so does the second player with a corresponding
Dirichlet gap. The two costs are coupled through a distributed field gaps. We prove that there
exists always a unique Nash equilibrium, which turns out to be the reconstructed data when
the Cauchy problem has a solution. We also prove that the completion algorithm is stable
with respect to noise. Some numerical 2D and 3D experiments are provided to illustrate the
efficiency and stability of our algorithm.
1. Introduction
We consider the following elliptic Cauchy problem :


∇.(k∇u) = 0 in Ω
u = f on Γc
k∇u.ν = Φ on Γc
(1)
where Ω is a bounded open domain in Rd (d = 2, 3) with a sufficiently smooth boundary ∂Ω
composed of two connected disjoint components Γc and Γi. The parameters k, f and Φ are
given functions, ν is the unit outward normal vector on the boundary. The Dirichlet data f
and the Neumann data Φ are the so-called Cauchy data, which are known on the accessible
part Γc of the boundary ∂Ω and the unknown field u is the Cauchy solution.
The above Cauchy problem is also known as a data completion problem, where the data
to be recovered, or missing data, are u|Γi and k∇u.ν|Γi , which are determined as soon as
one knows u in the whole domain Ω. Cauchy problem is a prototype of Inverse Boundary
Value Problems (IBVP), which model a wide field of applications ranging from medical
imaging to detection and nondestructive testing, and addressing quasi exhaustively all the
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fields of physics, from electromagnetism to acoustics, fluid and structural mechanics (see e.g.
[8, 9, 12, 16]).
Classically, IBVP are known to be ill-posed. For instance, the solution of Cauchy
problem does not always exist for any pair of data (f,Φ), and if such a solution exists, it does
not always depend continuously on the data (Hadamard’s ill-posedness, see [20]). The Cauchy
data (f,Φ) are called compatible (or consistent) if the corresponding Cauchy problem (1) has
a solution (it is then unique thanks to classical continuation arguments). Ill-posedness in the
sense of Hadamard makes classical numerical methods usually inappropriate because they
are unstable, and there is a need for carefully stabilized dedicated computational methods,
sometimes by regularizing (through reformulation of) the Cauchy problem itself. Readers
may refer to a wide literature dealing with the efficient numerical solution of elliptic Cauchy
problems, e.g. [3, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22] and, dealing with the ill-posedness for the Cauchy
problem, [2, 10, 11] among many others.
Our purpose is to introduce an original method to solve the Cauchy problem, based on
a game theory approach. We first recall in section 2 an optimal control formulation to solve
the Cauchy problem used in [1]. We then show in section 3 that the control formulation
naturally leads to a Nash game of static nature with complete information, which involves a
Dirichlet gap and a Neumann gap costs. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
is proved, and when the Cauchy solution exists, it turns out that the Nash equilibrium is
exactly the pair of missing data of the Cauchy problem; afterwards, we end the section
with a convergence result with respect to noisy data. Section 4 is devoted to sensitivity and
implementation aspects, used to lead some numerical experiments. The numerical results are
presented in section 5 to illustrate the efficiency of the present game-based approach. We end
the paper by some concluding remarks.
The reader interested in some PDE’s oriented applications of game theory may refer
to [18, 19], and refer to [7, 23, 24] for a general introduction and proof of convergence
of computational methods for Nash equilibria, and finally refer to [4, 5, 6] for a study of
alternating algorithms which are in close link with our present approach.
2. An optimal control formulation of the Cauchy problem
We assume that the boundary ∂Ω and the data k, Φ and f are smooth enough, at least ∂Ω is
of class C2 and (Φ, f) ∈ L2(Γc) × H1(Γc). In this case, the Cauchy solution u, if it exists,
belongs to the space H3/2(Ω).
In [1], the authors formulate the Cauchy problem (1) as an optimal control one. The
setting is as follows :
For given η ∈ L2(Γi) and τ ∈ H1(Γi), let us define u1(η) and u2(τ) as the unique
solutions in H1(Ω) of the following elliptic boundary value problems :
(SP1)


∇.(k∇u1) = 0 in Ω
u1 = f on Γc
k∇u1.ν = η on Γi
(SP2)


∇.(k∇u2) = 0 in Ω
u2 = τ on Γi
k∇u2.ν = Φ on Γc
(2)
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The optimization problem amounts to minimize, among all Neumann-Dirichlet pairs
(η, τ) ∈ L2(Γi)×H
1(Γi), the following “Neumann-gap” cost :
J1(η, τ) = 1(η, τ, u1(η), u2(τ)) =
1
2
∫
Γc
(k∇u1.ν−Φ)
2dΓc +
1
2
∫
Γi
(u1−u2)
2dΓi.(3)
The authors in [1] proved that when the Cauchy problem (1) has a solution, then solving
it is equivalent to solving the minimization problem
min
(η,τ)∈L2(Γi)×H1(Γi)
J1(η, τ). (4)
They also proved that the functional J1 is twice Fre´chet differentiable and strictly convex.
The same conclusions above hold when a “Dirichlet-gap” cost is considered :
J2(η, τ) = 2(η, τ, u1(η), u2(τ)) =
1
2
∫
Γc
(u2 − f)
2dΓc +
1
2
∫
Γi
(u1 − u2)
2dΓi. (5)
Let us remark that the choice of the functional spaces L2(Γi) and H1(Γi) as control
spaces allows for the cost functions to be well defined, since we know from classical a priori
estimates for elliptic boundary systems that u1 and u2 belong to the space H3/2(Ω) (so that
the normal derivatives k∇u1.ν and k∇u2.ν belong to L2(Γc), the natural space for the flux
data Φ).
3. A Nash game formulation of the Cauchy problem
From the previous section, we remark that, formulated in the game theory language, the
Neumann and Dirichlet controls η and τ do cooperate to minimize either the Neumann-gap or
the Dirichlet-gap costs. These two controls could as well cooperatively minimize any convex
combination of the two costs J1 and J2.
Now, the fields u1(η) and u2(τ) are aiming at the fulfillment of a possibly antagonistic
goals, namely minimizing the Neumann gap ‖k∇u1.ν − Φ‖L2(Γc) and the Dirichlet gap
‖u2−f‖L2(Γc). This antagonism is intimately related to Hadamard’s ill-posedness character of
the Cauchy problem, and rises as soon as one requires that u1 and u2 coincide, which is exactly
what the coupling term ‖u1 − u2‖L2(Γi) is for. Thus, one may think of an iterative process
which minimizes in a smart fashion the three terms, namely Neumann-Dirichlet-Coupling
terms.
Let us define the following two costs : for any η ∈ L2(Γi) and τ ∈ H1(Γi),
J1(η, τ) =
1
2
∫
Γc
(k∇u1.ν − Φ)
2dΓc +
α
2
∫
Ω
(u1 − u2)
2dΩ (6)
J2(η, τ) =
1
2
∫
Γc
(u2 − f)
2dΓc +
α
2
∫
Ω
(u1 − u2)
2dΩ (7)
where the fields u1(η) and u2(τ) are the unique solutions to (SP1) and (SP2), respectively.
Differently from the definition of J1,J2 above, the coupling term is now distributed over the
whole domain Ω and α is a given positive parameter (e.g. α = 1).
One may consider a decomposition-like method where the variable η is used to minimize
the Neumann gap + coupling term, in other words J1, and τ is used to minimize the Dirichlet
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gap + coupling term, which defines J2. Such a method fits into the area of mathematical
games.
We shall say that there are two players, referred to as player 1 or Neumann-gap, and
player 2 or Dirichlet-gap. Player 1 controls the strategy variable η, and player 2 controls the
strategy variable τ . Each of the two players tries to minimize its own cost, namely J1 for
player 1, and J2 for player 2. As classical, the fact that each player controls only his own
strategy, while there is a strong dependance of each player’s cost on the joint strategies (η, τ)
justifies the use of the game theory framework (and terminology), a natural setting which may
be used to formulate the negotiation between these two costs.
In order to be consistent with the initial formulation of the Cauchy problem, the relevant
game theoretic framework to deal with is a static with complete information one. In this case,
a commonly used solution concept (roughly speaking, in the game vocabulary, a rational and
stable one) is the one of Nash Equilibria, defined as follows :
Definition 1 A pair (ηN , τN) ∈ L2(Γi)×H1(Γi) is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NE)
if 

J1(ηN , τN) ≤ J1(η, τN), ∀η ∈ L
2(Γi),
J2(ηN , τN) ≤ J2(ηN , τ), ∀τ ∈ H
1(Γi).
(8)
It is of importance to notice that the present game has a separable structure. Indeed,
the players criteria are formed of individual costs, the Neumann-gap depending only on η for
player 1 and the Dirichlet-gap, depending only on τ for player 2, plus a common coupling cost
which depends on both η and τ . Such game belongs to a family referred to as Inertial Nash
Equilibration Processes in [5]. The game separable structure is crucial in our study, and we
shall exploit it to prove that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which is shown to be the
missing data when a Cauchy solution does exist. Based upon this structure of the criteria, we
shall also establish a convergence result with respect to noisy data.
As a preliminary, let us remark that the field u1(η) is affine with respect to η, and so is
the field u2(τ) w.r.t. the variable τ . Thus, the functions J1 and J2 are quadratic. Following
e.g. [1], it is an easy exercise to compute their second order differentials.
Let us consider the case of J1, the one of J2 follows the same steps. First, notice that we
can set
u1(η) = u1,0(η) + u1,f
where u1,0(η) solves the boundary value problem :


∇.(k∇u1,0) = 0 in Ω
u1,0 = 0 on Γc
k∇u1,0.ν = η on Γi
(9)
Then it is easy to compute the second order differential of J1 w.r.t. η in any direction
ψ ∈ L2(Γi) which reads :
(d2J1(η, τ).ψ, ψ) =
∫
Γc
(k∇u1,0(ψ).ν)
2dΓc + α
∫
Ω
(u1,0(ψ))
2dΩ.
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It is immediate that if (d2J1(η, τ).ψ, ψ) = 0 then u1,0(ψ) = 0, hence ψ = 0.
Indeed, strict convexity of J1 and J2 holds w.r.t. the pair (η, τ) as well. On the contrary,
we shall see that partial ellipticity (or coerciveness) of the costs holds while it does not w.r.t.
the pair (η, τ), precisely because of the coupling term.
Let us again focus on the case of J1. If partial ellipticity fails, then there exists a sequence
(ψn) ⊂ L
2(Γi) such that
|ψn|L2(Γi) = 1 and (d
2J1(η, τ).ψn, ψn)→ 0 when n→ +∞. (10)
Thanks to the classical regularity results and a priori estimates for elliptic BVPs, one gets
‖u1,0(ψn)‖H
3
2 (Ω)
≤ |ψn|L2(Γi)
So, up to a subsequence, (u1,0(ψn)) weakly converges in H
3
2 (Ω). By invoking the Rellich-
Kondrachov theorem, the sequence strongly converges to some z ∈ H1(Ω). Since (u1,0(ψn))
strongly converges to zero in L2(Ω) thanks to (10), one has z = 0. Now, thanks to the
continuity of the normal trace operator, one has ψn → k∇z.ν (= 0) in H− 12 (Γi), which is
in contradiction with |ψn|L2(Γi) = 1. We summarize the above preliminary results in the
Proposition 1 The partial mapping η → J1(η, τ) (resp. τ → J2(η, τ)) is a quadratic strongly
convex functional over L2(Γi) (resp. H1(Γi)).
It is important to notice that the partial ellipticity property of η → J1(η, τ) holds
uniformly w.r.t. τ , and conversely for J2. It allows us to bound the strategy spaces if necessary.
Following [5], let us introduce the functional L(η, τ) as follows :
L(η, τ) =
1
2
∫
Γc
(k∇u1(η).ν−Φ)
2dΓc +
1
2
∫
Γc
(u2(τ)−f)
2dΓc +
α
2
∫
Ω
(u1(η)−u2(τ))
2dΩ.(11)
It is easy to check that L is strictly convex, and that any minimum of L is a Nash
equilibrium and conversely, thanks to the separable structure of the present game (consider
the necessary optimality conditions). We conclude that if a Nash equilibrium exists, then it is
unique.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium (ηN , τN) ∈ L2(Γi) × H1(Γi), id est a pair which
fulfills (8), is obtained by a direct application of the Nash theorem : since strategy variables
belong to Hilbert spaces, the uniform partial ellipticity of the costs allows for the choice
of -large enough- closed bounded balls, which are then weakly compact convex sets, then
continuity of the convex costs yields the weak lower semi-continuity over the so-defined balls.
Finally, remark that if a Cauchy solution u does exist, then by setting ηC = k∇u.ν|Γi and
τC = u|Γi , one has immediately L(ηC , τC) = 0, since thanks to the uniqueness of the Cauchy
solution, u1(ηC) = u2(τC) = u. In this case, one has that (ηC , τC) is the minimum of the
nonnegative functional L, and so it is also the Nash equilibrium (ηN , τN).
We summarize the above results in the following:
Proposition 2 Consider the Nash game defined by (6)-(7)-(8).
(i) There always exists a unique Nash equilibrium (ηN , τN) ∈ L2(Γi) ×H1(Γi) . It is also
the minimum of L(η, τ) given by (11).
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(ii) When the Cauchy problem has a solution u, then u1(ηN) = u2(τN) = u, and (ηN , τN)
are the missing data, namely ηN = k∇u.ν|Γi and τN = u|Γi .
Let us now consider the case of noisy data. We assume that there exists a pair of
compatible data (f,Φ), and denote by u the corresponding Cauchy solution. We consider
a family of not necessarily compatible data (f δ,Φδ) ∈ H1(Γc)× L2(Γc) such that :
‖f δ − f‖2H1(Γc) + ‖Φ
δ − Φ‖2L2(Γc) ≤ δ
2. (12)
For given (η, τ) ∈ L2(Γi) × H1(Γi), the fields uδ1(η) and uδ2(τ) are solution of the
respective problems :


∇.(k∇uδ1) = 0 in Ω
uδ1 = f
δ on Γc
k∇uδ1.ν = η on Γi


∇.(k∇uδ2) = 0 in Ω
uδ2 = τ on Γi
k∇uδ2.ν = Φ
δ on Γc
(13)
We define the associated cost functionals :
Jδ1 (η, τ) =
1
2
∫
Γc
(k∇uδ1.ν − Φ
δ)2dΓc +
α
2
∫
Ω
(uδ1 − u
δ
2)
2dΩ (14)
Jδ2 (η, τ) =
1
2
∫
Γc
(uδ2 − f
δ)2dΓc +
α
2
∫
Ω
(uδ1 − u
δ
2)
2dΩ (15)
The functions Jδ1 and Jδ2 have the properties declined in Proposition-1, so there exists a unique
corresponding Nash equilibrium (ηδN , τ δN) ∈ L2(Γi)×H1(Γi).
One may ask if, when δ → 0, the Nash equilibrium (ηδN , τ δN) does converge to the missing
data (k∇u.ν|Γi , u|Γi) or, in other words, do the fields uδ1(ηδN) and uδ2(τ δN) converge to the
Cauchy solution u?
Let us again use the notation ηC = k∇u.ν|Γi and τC = u|Γi the Cauchy missing data, and
introduce the auxiliary functions zδ1 = uδ1(ηC) − u and zδ2 = uδ2(τC) − u. Then, using the
continuity of the trace operator from H 32 (Ω) onto H1(∂Ω), and the continuity of the normal
trace operator from H 32 (Ω) onto L2(∂Ω), it is easy to show that (obvious notation is used to
define Lδ from its definition in (11)) :
Lδ(ηC , τC) ≤ (1 + α)(‖z
δ
1‖
2
H
3
2 (Ω)
+ ‖zδ2‖
2
H
3
2 (Ω)
)
Using classical a priori estimates (zδ1 fulfills the elliptic equation with non-homogeneous
Dirichlet condition, and zδ2 a one with non-homogeneous Neumann condition), one gets :
Lδ(ηC , τC) ≤ (1 + α)
(
‖f δ − f‖2H1(Γc) + ‖Φ
δ − Φ‖2L2(Γc)
)
≤ (1 + α)δ2.(16)
We have previously seen that the Nash equilibrium (ηδN , τ δN) is also the unique minimum
of Lδ, thus we have :
Jδ1 (η
δ
N , τ
δ
N) ≤ L
δ(ηδN , τ
δ
N) ≤ L
δ(ηC , τC) ≤ (1 + α)δ
2 (17)
and Jδ2 (ηδN , τ δN) ≤ (1 + α)δ2 as well. Now, since the mapping η → Jδ1 (η, τ) is coercive,
uniformly in τ (and in δ), and since the same corresponding property holds for τ → Jδ2 (η, τ),
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we obtain that the sequence (ηδN) is uniformly bounded in L2(Γi) and (τ δN) is uniformly
bounded in H1(Γi). Up to a subsequence, we have from one part that ηδN converges weakly
to some η0N ∈ L
2(Γi), strongly in the H−
1
2 (Γi) topology. From other part, the sequence τ δN
converges weakly to some τ 0N ∈ H1(Γi), strongly in the H
1
2 (Γi) topology. Since the sequence
f δ strongly converges to f in H1(Γc) and Φδ strongly converges to Φ in L2(Γc), we conclude
that the sequences uδ1(ηδN) and uδ2(τ δN), which are the solutions to equations (13), strongly
converge in H1(Ω) to respectively u1(η0N) and u2(τ 0N) which are the unique solutions to the
respective equations:


∇.(k∇u1) = 0 in Ω
u1 = f on Γc
k∇u1.ν = η
0
N on Γi


∇.(k∇u2) = 0 in Ω
u2 = τ
0
N on Γi
k∇u2.ν = Φ on Γc
(18)
Taking δ → 0 in (17) yields that (k∇uδ1.ν−Φδ) strongly converges to 0 in L2(Γc), which
means that (k∇uδ1.ν) strongly converges to Φ in L2(Γc) so a fortiori in H−
1
2 (Γc). Hence,
k∇u1.ν = Φ over Γc. Thanks to the uniqueness of the Cauchy problem, we conclude that
u1 = u. The same reasoning applied to the coupling term in Jδ1 would directly yield u1 = u2
and thanks to the equations (18), the two fields are equal to the Cauchy solution u as well.
Finally, we have proved that the sequence (ηδN) strongly converges in L2(Γi) to η0N =
ηC = k∇u.ν|Γi and that the sequence (τ δN) strongly converges in H1(Γi) to τ 0N = τC = u|Γi .
Proposition 3 Assume there exists a unique Cauchy solution u ∈ H1(Ω) for a given
compatible pair of data (f,Φ) ∈ H1(Γc) × L2(Γc). Let (f δ,Φδ) ∈ H1(Γc) × L2(Γc) be
any sequence of noisy data such that
‖f δ − f‖2H1(Γc) + ‖Φ
δ − Φ‖2L2(Γc) ≤ δ
2.
Then, the Nash game corresponding to the costs Jδ1 and Jδ2 defined by (14)-(15) has a
unique Nash equilibrium (ηδN , τ δN) ∈ L2(Γi) × H1(Γi) which strongly converges, as δ → 0,
to the Cauchy missing data (k∇u.ν|Γi , u|Γi).
Moreover, the solutions to the equations (13), respectively uδ1(ηδN) and uδ2(τ δN), strongly
converge in H1(Ω) to the Cauchy solution u.
4. Numerical procedure
From the computational viewpoint, in [5] the authors propose an alternating minimization
algorithm to compute the Nash Equilibrium by means of the following iterative process :
Let (η0, τ 0) be a given initial state ;

η(k+1) = argminη{J1(η, τ (k)) +
β
2
∫
Γi
(η − η(k))2dΓi},
τ (k+1) = argminτ{J2(η(k+1), τ) +
β
2
∫
Γi
(τ − τ (k))2dΓi},
(19)
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where β is a given positive parameter (e.g. β = 1).
In the cited reference, the convergence of the alternating algorithm above is proved, under
suitable assumptions which also hold in our case, see Proposition 1.
Our algorithm is written as follows :
Set k = 0. Starting from an initial guess S(0) = (η(0), τ (0)):
Step 1: Compute η(k), which solves minη J1(η, τ (k));
Step 2: Compute τ (k), which solves minτ J2(η(k+1), τ);
Step 3: Set S(k+1) = (η(k+1), τ (k+1)) = t (η(k), τ (k)) + (1− t) (η(k), τ (k)), 0 < t < 1.
Redo (Step 1) until the sequence S(k) converges. As a stopping criterion we choose a
classical one, the first k such that,
‖S(k+1) − S(k)‖ ≤ ǫ,
where ǫ is given small enough parameter.
It is easy to show that the above procedure is equivalent to the algorithm (19) as soon as
one uses a fixed step gradient method to solve the partial optimization problems in Step 1 and
Step 2 above. For numerical problem, we used the discetized version which was proved to
converge in [24].
To this end, the gradients may be efficiently computed by means of an adjoint state
method. Let us define the following Lagrangian:
L(η, τ, τ ∗, u1, u2, λ1, λ2) =
α
2
∫
Ω
(u1 − u2)
2 dΩ +
1
2
∫
Γc
(k∇u1.ν − Φ)
2 dΓc
+
∫
Ω
k∇u1.∇λ1 dΩ−
∫
Γi
ηλ1 dΓi
+
∫
Ω
k∇u2.∇λ2 dΩ−
∫
Γc
Φλ2 dΓc
+
∫
Γi
(u2 − τ)τ
∗ dΓi
(20)
where (η, τ) ∈ L2(Γi) × H1(Γi), (u1, u2, λ1, λ2) ∈ H
3
2 (Ω) × H
3
2 (Ω) × W1 × W2 and
τ ∗ ∈ L2(Γi), where the latter two spaces are given by :
W1 = {v ∈ H
3
2 (Ω) such that v|Γc = 0} and W2 = {v ∈ H
3
2 (Ω) such that v|Γi = 0}.
The Lagrangian is used to compute the gradients ∇ηJ1 and ∇τJ2 :
Proposition 4 We have the following two partial derivatives:

∂J1
∂η
(η, τ)ξ = −
∫
Γi
λ1ξ dΓi, for all ξ ∈ L2(Γi)
whereλ1 ∈W1 solves the adjoint problem:
∫
Ω
k∇λ1.∇γ dΩ = −α
∫
Ω
(u1 − u2)γ dΩ−
∫
Γc
(k∇u1.ν − Φ)(k∇γ.ν) dΓc, γ ∈ W1
(21)
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and 

∂J2
∂τ
(η, τ)h =
∫
Γi
(k∇λ2.ν)h dΓi, h ∈ H
1(Γi)
whereλ2 ∈W2 solves the adjoint problem:


∇.k∇λ2 = α (u1 − u2) in Ω
k∇λ2.n = f − u2 on Γc
λ2 = 0 on Γi
(22)
5. Numerical results
The computational methodology used to illustrate the efficiency of the present approach
is classical. All experiments are performed on a Personal Computer and all the partial
differential equations are numerically solved using FreeFem++ [21], a Finite Element based
free software. In order to obtain accurate approximations of the normal derivatives of u1 and
of λ2, the dual Raviart-Thomas mixed finite elements are used.
We consider a domain Ω defined as the open bounded set delimited by two concentric
circles in 2D test-cases, or two concentric spheres in 3D test-cases. The inner boundary plays
the role of Γi, where the trace and normal derivative are missing, and the outer one plays the
one of Γc where the latter information is over specified.
We then consider explicit well-known analytical solutions, generically denoted by u,
which are harmonic inside the domain Ω, and set the trace and normal derivative of u over Γc
as being the measured data f = u|Γc and Φ = (k∇u.ν)|Γc . We sometimes refer to these data
as temperature and flux (with obvious interpretation).
In order to test the robustness of the proposed method we add a white noise to the
temperature f and the heat flux Φ as follows:
fσ = u+ σw1 and Φσ = k∇u.ν + σw2, on Γc, (23)
where σ denotes the noise level relative to ‖.‖L2(Γc) of u and k∇u.ν respectively, whereas
(w1, w2) are normelly distributed random functions.
Our algorithm performs a denoising task on the noisy prescribed Cauchy data fσ and Φσ.
For instance, let us denote by (τσN , ησN) the Nash equilibrium associated to the latter noisy over
specified data. Then, the pair of optimal solutions (u2(τN)|Γc , (k∇u˜1.ν)|Γc) may be viewed
as regularized Cauchy data obtained from the noisy Cauchy data, where u˜1 is the solution of

∆u˜1 = 0 in Ω,
u˜1 = u2(τN) on Γc,
k∇u˜1.ν = ηN on Γi.
(24)
We present numerical results which illustrate the stability of our method with respect to
noisy data, as well as an example of the noise deblurring property underlined above. The
presented graphics are related to the profiles over Γi of the Dirichlet and Neumann missing
data and to the fields u1 and u2. We also provide convergence relative errors history, related to
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the fields and to the missing profiles, as a function of iterations and for different noise levels.
We also present a stationarity history for the Nash overall computation iterations.
The computation of the Nash equilibrium is performed as described in section 4, where
the partial optimization tasks of Step-1 and Step-2 use a fixed line-search gradient method.
Here, it is sufficient to carry out only few iterations in the optimization process in each step. A
second formulation would be obtained, if we assume that the players compute not sequentially,
but in parallel with step-1, in the Step-2 we compute τ (k) which solves minτ J2(η(k), τ).
An arbitrary initial guess such as S(0) = (η(0), τ (0)) = (0, 0) is chosen to start-up the
algorithm, the physical function k takes the constant value 1 in Ω, and the parameters α
(weight of the coupling term in the costs) and t (relaxation parameter in the computation of
Nash equilibrium) are set to α = 1 and t = 0.25.
5.1. Two 2D test-cases
We consider an annular domainΩwith circular boundary components Γi and Γc, both centered
at (0, 0) and with radii Ri = 0.6 and Rc = 1, respectively.
Test-case A. The first 2D experiment is related to a smooth case. The -artificial- Cauchy
data f and Φ are defined as respectively the trace and normal derivative, over the circle Γc, of
the harmonic function :
u(x, y) = excos(y).
In figure-1, the missing data τN and ηN are presented at convergence of the algorithm
(19) dedicated to the computation of the Nash equilibrium, for different noise levels σ. The
obtained Dirichlet as well as Neumann profiles show remarkable stability with respect to
noise.
Test-case B. The second 2D experiment is related to the singular function :
u(x, y) = Re(
1
z − a
), where z = x+ iy.
In this case, the singularity source, located at a = (0.5, 0), is in the vicinity of the circle
Γi, and reconstruction of the solution over this boundary is a numerically challenging task,
particularly in the case of noisy data.
The results in figure-2 show again the stability of our method. The profile shape is
well captured including the localization of the singularity peak, whose magnitude is however
underestimated for the trace as well as for the normal derivative.
Finally, the denoising effect, through computing the Nash equilibrium and solving of
equation (24), is actually observed in figure-3 for a noise level of 5%.
5.2. Two 3D test-cases
As for the 2D case, we consider a thick spherical shell domain Ω with boundary components
Γi and Γc, which are two spheres both centered at (0, 0, 0) and with radii given by respectively
Ri = 0.6 and Rc = 1.
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Again two functions, denoted by u, are selected to play the role of exact solutions to the
Cauchy problem for the Laplace operator. To this end, the Cauchy data f and Φ are defined
as respectively the trace and normal derivative of the involved functions over the sphere Γc.
Test-case C. The first function is radial, so it is of constant trace over each of the spherical
components of the boundary:
u(x, y, z) =
1√
x2 + y2 + z2
. (25)
The function u given by (25) is the solution of ∆u = δ0, where δ0 is the Dirac distribution
at the origin (0, 0, 0), a point source that is not in Ω, so u is harmonic and smooth enough
inside Ω.
In figure-4, level set slices are shown for the fields u1 and u2 at convergence for noise
free and 5% noisy data. The overall Nash algorithm (19) converged in 150 iterations. More
detailed issues related to the convergence are presented in figure-5. Relative L2-errors behave
well in the noise free and in the noisy cases. The relative errors on reconstructed fields
decrease as well as do the ones relative to the missing data (converged Nash strategies, which
we recall are respectively the trace of u1 and the normal trace of u2 over the sphere Γi).
The sensitivity of the reconstructed fields and missing data to the noise level σ is
shown in figure-6. Interestingly, boundary missing data are much less sensitive than the
domain distributed fields. Both of them exhibit a satisfactory stable behavior w.r.t. the noise
magnitude.
Test-case D. The second function is given by
u(x, y, z) =
1√
(x+ 0.2)2 + y2 + z2
. (26)
The function u given by (26) is the non-radial solution of ∆u = δX0 , where the source
term is now X0 = (−0.2, 0, 0).
In this experiment we put 5% of noise in (f,Φ) according to (23). The obtained
results are illustrated in figure-7, where the reconstructed fields u1 and u2 are presented at
convergence. The non radial missing data are presented in figure-8 and relative L2-errors on
the reconstructed fields and boundary data are shown in figure-9.
Even though the error curves do monotonically decrease towards zero for the two test-
cases C and D, the stagnation that appears quite early (around iterations 80-120 in the present
case) suggests that multilevel or hierarchical optimization approaches should be designed to
speed-up the convergence of the Nash algorithm.
6. Conclusion
Let us conclude the paper with some short remarks. First of all, we have used the
simplest class of games to model the completion problem, namely the class of static games
with complete information. This simple game formulation yields interesting results like
the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium even when the Cauchy data are not
compatible, and also the fact that the Nash equilibrium is the missing data when the Cauchy
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problem has a solution. Investigation of more sophisticated classes of games such as
dynamical games with incomplete information may lead to new efficient data completion
algorithms. It is also interesting to notice that solving the data completion problem with our
method makes use of the standard computational tools, be it finite element or optimization
codes. The numerical experiments presented for different test-cases prove that our method
exhibits remarkable numerical stability with respect to noisy Cauchy data.
References
[1] Aboulaı¨ch R, Ben Abda A and Kallel M 2008 Missing boundary data reconstruction via an approximate
optimal control Inverse Problems and Imaging 2 411–426
[2] Alessandrini G, Rondi L, Rosset E and Vessella S 2009 The stability for the Cauchy problem for elliptic
equations Inverse Problems 25 123004 (47pp)
[3] Andrieux S, Baranger T and Ben Abda A 2006 Solving Cauchy problems by minimizing an energy-like
functional Inverse Problems 22 115–133
[4] Attouch H, Redont P and Soubeyran A 2007 A new class of alternating proximal minization algorithms
with costs-to-move SIAM J. Optim. 18 1061–1081
[5] Attouch H, Bolte J, Redont P and Soubeyran A 2008 Alternating proximal algorithms for weakly coupled
convex minimization problems. Applications to dynamical games and PDE’s J. Convex Anal. 15 485–
506
[6] Attouch H and Soueycatt M 2009 Augmented Lagrangian and proximal alternating direction methods of
multipliers in Hilbert spaces. Applications to games, PDE’s and control Pacific J. Optim 5 17–37
[7] Basar T 1987 Relaxation techniques and asynchronous algorithms for on-line computation of non-
cooperative equilibria Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 11 531–549
[8] Ben Abda A, Kallel M, Leblond J and Marmorat J-P 2002 Line-segment cracks recovery from incomplete
boundary data Inverse Problems 18 1057–1077
[9] Ben Abda A, Ben Hassen F, Leblond J and Mahjoub M 2009 Sources recovery from boundary data: a
model related to electroencephalography, Mathematical and Computer Modelling 49 2213–2223
[10] Ben Belgacem F 2007 Why is the Cauchy problem severely ill-posed? Inverse Problems 23 823–36
[11] Bourgeois L 2010 About stability and regularization of ill-posed elliptic Cauchy problems: the case of C1,1
domains ESAIM: M2AN 44 715–35
[12] Chaabane S, Jaoua M and Leblond J 2003 Parameter identification for Laplace equation and approximation
in analytic classes J. Inv. Ill-Posed Problems 11 35-57
[13] Cao H and Pereverzv S V 2007 The balancing principle for the regularization of elliptic Cauchy problems
Inverse Problems 23 1943–1961
[14] Chakib A and Nachaoui A 2006 Convergence analysis for finite element approximation to an inverse
Cauchy problem Inverse Problems 22 1191–1206
[15] Cimetie`re A, Delvare F, Jaoua M and Pons F 2001 Solution of the Cauchy problem using iterated Tikhonov
regularization Inverse Problems 17 553–570
[16] Cimetie`re A, Delvare F, Jaoua M, Kallel M and Pons F 2002 Recovery of cracks from incomplete boundary
data Inverse Problems in Engineering 10 377–392
[17] Dinh Nho Hao and Lesnic D 2000 The Cauchy problem for Laplace’s equation via the conjugate gradient
method IMA Journal of Applied Mathematics 65 199–217
[18] Habbal A 2005 A topology Nash game for tumoral antiangiogenesis Structural and Multidisciplinary
Optimization 30 404–412
[19] Habbal A, Petersson J and Thellner M 2004 Multidisciplinary topology optimization solved as a Nash
game Int. J. Numer. Meth. Engng 61 949–963
[20] Hadamard J 1953 Lectures on Cauchy’s Problem in Linear Partial Differential Equation, Dover, New york
USA
Data completion problems solved as Nash games 13
[21] Hecht F, Le Hyaric A and Pironneau O Freefem++, Univ. Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, software available
at http://www.freefem.org/ff++/
[22] Kozlov V A, Maz’ya V G and Fomin A V 1991 An iterative method for solving the Cauchy problems for
elliptic equations Comput. Math. Phys. 31 45–52
[23] Li S and Basar T 1987 Distributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibria Automatica
23 523–533
[24] Uryas’ev S and Rubinstein R Y 1994 On relaxation algorithms in computation of noncooperative equilibria
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 39 1263–1267
Data completion problems solved as Nash games 14
 0.5
 1
 1.5
-3 -2 -1  0  1  2  3
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
angle
exact_sol
noise=1%
noise=3%
noise=5%
-1.5
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
-3 -2 -1  0  1  2  3
flu
x
angle
exact_sol
noise=1%
noise=3%
noise=5%
Figure 1. Test-case A. Reconstructed smooth Dirichlet (τN , left) and Neumann (ηN , right)
data over Γi. The profiles are presented at convergence and for various amounts of noise level
σ ∈ {1%, 3%, 5%}. The corresponding traces of the exact solution are also plotted. The Finite
Element computations are performed with 1529 nodes and 2788 triangles.
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Figure 2. Test-case B. Reconstructed singular Dirichlet (τN , left) and Neumann (ηN , right)
data over Γi. The profiles are presented at convergence and for various amounts of noise level
σ ∈ {1%, 3%, 5%}. The corresponding traces of the exact solution are also plotted. The Finite
Element computations are performed with 5405 nodes and 10310 triangles.
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Figure 3. Test-case A. Regularization of noisy Cauchy data (noise level is σ = 5%). At
convergence : (left) the smoothed profile u2(τN )|Γc (− line) is compared to the random fσ
(+ dots) ; (right) the smoothed flux profile k∇u˜1.ν|Γc (− line) is compared to Φσ (+ dots).
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4. Test-case C. Top row : noise level is 0%. At convergence, we plot a plane slice of
the level sets of (a) u1 and (b) u2. Bottom row : noise level is 5%. At convergence, are plotted
the level sets of (c) u1 and (d) u2. The Finite Element computations are performed with 4740
nodes and 22795 tetrahedral elements.
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Figure 5. Test-case C. Top row : Relative L2-errors are presented as a function of overall
Nash iterations k, for a noise level σ = 0%. (a) reconstructed fields : ‖u(k)i −u‖/‖u‖, i = 1, 2
and Nash strategies ds = ‖S(k) − S(k−1)‖ ; (b) missing Dirichlet data : ‖τ (k) − u|Γi‖/‖u|Γi‖
and Neumann data ‖η(k) − ∂u
∂ν |Γi
‖/‖∂u
∂ν |Γi
‖. Bottom row : The corresponding relative errors
for a noise level σ = 5% are plotted in (c)–(d).
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Figure 6. Test-case C. Sensitivity of the reconstructed fields to noisy Cauchy data (fσ,Φσ).
L2-errors are presented as a function of the noise level σ : (a) reconstructed fields :
‖ui − u‖/‖u‖, i = 1, 2 ; (b) missing data : Dirichlet ‖τN − u|Γi‖/‖u|Γi‖ and Neumann
‖ηN −
∂u
∂ν |Γi
‖/‖∂u
∂ν |Γi
‖.
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Figure 7. Test-case D. Non radial case. Noise level is 5%. The level sets of the reconstructed
fields (a) u1 and (b) u2 are presented at convergence. The Finite Element computations are
performed with 4740 nodes and 22795 tetrahedral elements.
Data completion problems solved as Nash games 18
0
2
4
6
8
0
1
2
3
4
1
1.5
2
2.5
Dirichlet
0
2
4
6
8
0
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
Neumann
Figure 8. Test-case D. Reconstructed non radial Dirichlet (τN , left) and Neumann (ηN , right)
data over Γi. The profiles are presented at convergence and for a noise level σ = 5%.
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Figure 9. Test-case D. Relative L2-errors are presented for the non radial case as a
function of the overall Nash iterations. Noise level is 5%. (a) reconstructed fields error :
‖u
(k)
i − u‖/‖u‖, i = 1, 2 and Nash strategies ds = ‖S(k) − S(k−1)‖ ; (b) missing Dirichlet
data : ‖τ (k) − u|Γi‖/‖u|Γi‖ and Neumann data ‖η(k) − ∂u∂ν |Γi‖/‖
∂u
∂ν |Γi
‖.
